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Abstract 
 
The Spanish regulatory authority recently implemented a new interconnection regime based on 
capacity (and not per time) payments in fixed telecommunications. We propose a dynamic duopolistic 
model of final service competition in which the entrant first acquires a certain capacity at the local loop 
(at a fixed payment) from the incumbent and then both operators compete in prices for the final services. 
We introduce the entrant’s possibility to assign efficiently the traffic he offer between differ nt hours 
along the day as well as the possibility for him to use the capacity based model as well as the per-unit-of-
time interconnection regime vis à vis the incumbent. The results show that, the simultaneous use of both 
interconnection models (instead of only the one based on time) leads always to tougher competition (more 
aggressive pricing) in the final service market and efficiency (internal to the firm and allocative) gains. 
Nevertheless, the entrant needs a minimum scale before this new model can b  a viable alternative. In 
addition, once reached this scale, its convenience for the entrant will depend on certain conditions. 
 
Resumen 
 
Recientemente el regulador español ha implementado un nuevo modelo de interconexión en redes 
fijas de telecomunicac ones basado en la compra de capacidad que podrá ser utilizado en combinación 
con el modelo habitual de interconexión por tiempo. Se propone un modelo dinámico de competencia en 
duopolio en el cual el entrante puede comprar ex ante un cierto nivel de capa idad al incumbente para 
luego ambos operadores competir en precios. Se introduce la posibilidad de que el entrante pueda asignar 
eficientemente el tráfico entre distintas franjas horarias. Los resultados muestran que el uso simultáneo de 
ambos modelos genera una competencia más agresiva en precios y puede llegar a producir significativas 
ganancias de eficiencia (asignativa y otras internas a la firma). De cualquier forma, el entrante necesita 
alcanzar una masa crítica antes de que el nuevo modelo pueda representar una alternativa para él. 
Además, una vez alcanzado este nivel, su conveniencia para el entrante dependerá de determinadas 
condiciones. 
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1. Introduction 
Until recently, practically anywhere in the world, the only used method of interconnection 
(understood like an intermediate service) between fixed telecommunication networks, was the 
interconnection based on the number of units-of-time (minutes) acquired by the entrants (IxT). 
This regime involves the imposition on the newcomers of a cost structure (function) for the local 
infrastructure that is diametrically opposite to the incumbent o e, and in fact, far from real. The 
incumbent operators don’t face relatively high variable per-unit-of-tim  cost of usage in the local 
loop, while entrants have to pay this variable cost without being able to exploit any economy of 
scale, or scope, across time for the use of the infrastructure.  
Then, under the IxTmodel, the new operators are not capable to emulate the supplies of the 
once monopolist, and have few options to reduce the asymmetries that differentiate them unless 
they can build their own infrastructure. Furthermore, the entrant’s incentives to increase traffic 
are not so evident, because his average cost stays constant. 
The Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones (CMT), Spanish regulatory authority, 
recently has implemented an alternative to the IxT which consists in that the entrants can acquire 
interconnection capacity blocks2 and use it freely. It would have sense to think that a model of 
interconnection based on capacity (IxC) and not based on per-unit-of-time usage, will allow the 
newcomers to create services and choose tariff schemes nearer to those expected in effective 
competition. In addition, they will be able to make use of the infrastructure, at least 
proportionally similar as the incumbent does because part of th  variable costs of these new 
operators would become fixed costs. 
With the introduction of the IxC model (both coexisting), the entrant’s cost structure changes 
importantly. Now, they can achieve greater economies of scale (limited by the maximum 
capacity they rent) across the hours of the day, switching traffic from one hour (peak) to another 
(off-peak) as well as improving his corporate image when expanding his range of services. This 
change in the cost structure is also reflected in a more aggressive price competition. Then, it is 
not so evident that the IxC be the best alternative for the entrant, at least before getting a critical 
mass. Additionally, one would hope that the capacity payment regime allows the entrants to 
implement non-li ear tariffs structures to the final customers, with all the efficiency gains that 
this may bring about in the market. 
The CMT hopes that this new model brings on to the entrants: extra marginal income, smaller 
marginal costs, and an improvement of the traffic distribution, among other benefits.  
                                                
2 With the purpose of avoiding possible confusions, throughout the document will be used the expression “capacity 
block” instead of “capacity unit” (without a better alternativ ). This is because the term “unit” could be associated with 
“smallness”. 
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It is important to mention that the regulator doesn’t try to make attractive the IxC model by 
means of the interconnection prices itself but with the possibility of internalizing the management 
performance potential, this, as well, will transfer a certain risk to the entrants. 
The IxC regime is already known in other markets, e.g., Internet backbones, international 
settlement traffic among operators, and so forth. Even though, the payments mechanisms at play 
in each market differ greatly. We want top focus on the effects on competition, tariff structures 
and dynamic effects of the capacity interconnection regime recently introduced in fixed 
telephony. 
In this document, we proposed an approach to the design of an IxC model within the habitual 
frame of the unidirectional fixed telecommunications, in the sense that the incumbent is the only 
one who provides interconnection. The paper is structured as follows: in section 2, the basic 
model is exposed, including intrinsic and particular characteristi s of the IxC model (and 
therefore nonexistent in an IxT model) and these are compared with those of the IxT model. In 
addition, we emphasized the possibility of using the (potential) management of resources that we 
call “network dimension” as a generating “spark plug” of a more aggressive price competition 
(instead of using for this purpose the interconnection prices itself). Section 3 shows the 
equilibrium prices and profits under different tariff schemes and under both models. Some 
welfare implications are commented in section 4. Finally, section 5 contains the main 
conclusions. 
2. The model 
The proposed model is a modification of that used by Bijl and Peitz (reference 2) to 
characterize a situation of competition in operator’s selecti n and pre-selection. In this model is 
assume that the newcomer doesn’t have (his own) infrastructure with the exception of “the 
backbone”3, that is, he needs to buy interconnection to the incumbent to be able to reach the end 
users. It maintains the essence of seminal results of the literature on the economic theory of 
network interconnection like those of Armstrong (1998), Carter and Wright (1999), and Laffont, 
King, and Tirole (1998a, b), among others. 
In this document two minor modifications have been done to the original, so that here: 1) the 
incumbent’s marginal costs are zero (a particularization), and 2) the operators can charge a 
subscription fee4 (a generalization). One of the consequences that would be expected with the 
introduction of an IxC model is the increase in the entrant’s incentives for the establishment of 
flat tariffs. 
                                                
3 It is common, at least during the first stage of the competition, that the new operators have an incipient infrastructure 
(in proportion to the incumbent one). 
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Anyway, the contribution consists of the following changes: maintaining the original model 
(with the modifications previously suggested) and taking it as a reference, it is created other 
based on interconnection capacity (and not per time) payments. Both models represent the 
options to compete for the entrant at the beginning of every period. 
Consider the following general assumptions: there are two operators, the incumbent, and the 
entrant. They play a dynamic game because the sequence of stages is repeated over an arbitrary 
number of periods. The incumbent is the only source of interconnection, moreover, at the 
beginning of the game, he has all the market, and at the beginning of each period, he has all the 
productive resources of the economy, i.e., the capacity is only usable for the effective period5. 
(these characteristics partially define him). Suppose that his capacity is large enough to satisfy his 
own demand and that of the newcomer (in this sense, capacity restrictions don’t exist). Assume 
also that the operators have total coverage, i.e., they compete at any moment for all the market 
(e.g. a province). 
2.1. Sequence of stages 
The situation analyzed consists of the following sequences of stags in every period6: 
Stage a) the regulator determines the prices of both interconnection methods: per time (a) 
and by capacity (P)7. To make the analysis simple assume that these prices are constant 
throughout time8. In addition, the prices are proportionally equivalent, (we will justify this 
assumption later). The incumbent offers the interconnection contract menu to the entrant.  
Stage b) the entrant decides the way to compete for completely satisfy his estimated demand 
of incoming and outgoing traffic. He selects a contract mixture between IxT and IxC9, and if this 
last contract is included, he must decide how many blocks to acquire and finally buy them. The 
entrant’s behavior can be i tuitively understood as follow: he anticipates the equilibrium prices 
and profits for each of the possible alternatives and then chooses that that maximize his benefits 
based on which the rival chooses (backward induction).
                                                                                                                                                 
4 See reference 2, section 6.4, 7.2 and 7.3. There, the authors review the implications of the two-part tariffs but they 
only do it when both operators compete with complete infrastructure (two-way acc ss). 
5 Otherwise, the entrant doesn’t take any risk. In addition, the regulator as established fines for wrong estimation of 
the resources requirements. Anyway, we only consider that since the entrant cannot obtain income from the excess 
capacity but exp nses, this one act like a fine by itself (although only for the case of verload). In other words, the cost 
incurred by the incumbent because of the entrant’s bad planning is ignored. 
6 There doesn’t exist a unique way to link the periods with the real time. Anyway, the parameters have been considered 
in monthly terms. This could not be in agreement with some other model elements, then, with the pertinent changes the 
duration of the period could be linked to, e.g.: the price revisions (operator’s and regulator prices); the speed with 
which the entrant gains market share in the simulations; or the form in which it has been defined the growth of h . 
7 We don’t modelize the regulatory decision. The players take it as exogenous. 
8 Notice that those prices are independent of the volume of contracted capacity. 
9 The mixed schemes will be viable at a global level and supported by the principle of complementariness between 
methods. Despite of this, the operators compete in pure strategies because, although the entrant can choose a contract 
mixture, chooses it with probability one. 
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Stage c) the operators compete “à la Bertrand” to determine their (equilibrium) retail prices. 
The solution concept is the subgames perfect Nash equilibrium in every period (the operators are 
myopic because don’t consider that today’s prices will determine tomorrow’s initial market 
shares). In the price determination is taken into account the consumer behavi r (it will  defined 
later) and that, if necessary, the entrant will buy on a per-time basis, all the interconnection that 
he requires to completely satisfy his demand. This is the only way in which it will be allowed to 
use both interconnection models. 
Stage d) observing the prices and his particular switch cost, each consumer subscribes to one 
operator10 (they only can decide if to remain or to change) and later makes his telephone calls11. 
Stage e) the rest of the variables are obtained. The market shares in t will be taken as the 
initials in t+1.  
Now, the particular way in which the stages elements are carried out is exposed. 
2.2. The consumer 
The market has a fixed size of n consumers12. They are homogenous in the sense that they 
have the same utility and demand parameters. However, in order to allow for a realistic transition 
of market shares over time, we introduce heterogeneity: a consumer who wants to switch from 
one operator to the other incurs a switching cost (SC). It emerges because capturing market sh e 
from a well-known, established firm requires great marketing efforts and substantially better 
price-quality combinations by the entrants. Hence, although the minimum negotiable unit of final 
good is homogenous, for a particular consumer, calling from ny operator in view of the fact that 
he is affiliated to one of them, is not. 
Several price structures are contemplated. In particular, let the retail per-minute-price be 
denoted by p. At that price, an individual consumes ( )px  call minutes and derives ( )( )pxu  of 
                                                
10 Therefore, the service demand (but not the call demand) is inelastic whenever the participation restriction is not 
violated. 
11 Since no information is added from one decision to the other, these could be taken as simultaneous. We consider it 
separately only for the benefit of the exposition. 
12 In the real market, the operator problem consists of maximizing the benefits derived from a collection of 
interconnection points, each one with a certain estimated traffic. Thus, it could be possible to transfer traffic from a 
point to another one by geographic, technological or another type of relation if this were in the operator’s interest. 
Although the analysis of the strategic complementarity among interconnection points (alternative routing) can b  very 
interesting, in this work the problem is simplified too much.  We did not think in terms of interconnection points 
(therefore we did not take into account its strategic interaction) but in terms of capacity requirements. Then, n is the 
number of consumers arbitrarily related with the generation of certain traffic volume. We suppose that the aggregate 
problem is obtained fitting the parameters. Being strict, many others aspects exist that the model doesn’t consider: e.g., 
congestion and overloads, effects of the sharing or not of resources, possibility f discounts, type of interconnection 
point (optical, electrical, etc.), “clock stop” of evolution of the project, types of traffic or levels of interconnection 
(only access and completion are considered). 
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utility. This function is expressed in monetary units and satisfies ( ) 0>¢ xu  and ( ) 0<¢¢ xu  
[ ]xx ~,0Î" 13, where ( ){ }xux
x
maxarg~= . As usual, the individual demand arises from ( ) pxu =¢ . 
The consumer problem is ( ){ }mxpxuv
x
--+= hmax 14. Two new terms have been 
introduced by the previous expressions, the subscription fee, m, and h . L th  be an exogenous 
component of the utility intrinsically related to subscribing to an operator and not to the rival. It 
can be seen like loyalty to the company, better quality, confidence, etc. It makes sense to think 
that whereas the incumbent already has formed it and maintains it at a constant level, the 
newcomers are constructing it throughout time (e.g. supposed a learning curve). Without this, the 
operators are “excessively symmetric” and an entrant could gain market “too fast” whil  in 
reality, entrants typically increase quality levels over time. 
Summarizing, the consumers make two decisions: they choose an operator and an amount of 
minutes of use15. They do it anticipating the utility they would obtain with each operator 
(resolving their problem) according to his indirect utility function, v, which provides all the 
information they need. 
2.3. The market 
In order to simplify the notation subscript 1 will be related to the incumbent and 2, to the 
entrant. Superscripts will refer to time. Other elements will be introduced along the paper. 
At the beginning of the game, all the operators have a market share of f  (ini ial end wment). 
Unless another thing was said, the game begins in a moment in which 101 =f , and 0
0
2 =f
16.  
a is the inverse of the substitution degree between players. At the beginning of period t the 
consumers of operator i, have a SC uniformly distributed in [ ]1,0 -tisf . Then, the indifferent 
consumer between remain with the incumbent and leave him in favor of the entrant will be that 
for which tt SC 12 nn =-
Ù
 (where 110
-
Ù
££ tSC sf ), that implies that all those consumers with 
[ ]ttSC 12,0 nn -Î , leave the incumbent. Consequently, the percentage of incumbent consumers who
remain is 
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ -
+ -1
1
211
t
tt vv
sf
 whose proportion in a market level gives the operator share in t. This is,
.21111 s
ff
tt
tt vv -+= -  (1) 
                                                
13 In others words the utility function is continuous, quasiconcave and strictly monotone. 
14 Following Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b), this implies that the consumers don’t restrain to call when the prices 
increase but simply call less or make shorter calls. 
15 Of a single type, let us say local. 
16 Of this form is avoided any possible complication related to justify (others) initial values. Moreover, the entrance 
process of present and later operators is ignored. 
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The market share is an essential element of the dynamic model because it is the link between 
periods (the state variable). 
2.4. Specifics introduced by the IxC model 
In reality, the managed traffic by an operator doesn’t follow strictly a uniform distribution 
along the day and most of the time is below the saturation point (e.g. the network is underused in 
off-peak hours). So, assume the existence of leftover res urces because the network is not used at 
any moment and at full capacity17. We introduce the following definitions exclu ively related to 
one capacity block 18:  
· Let h be the hour with the highest traffic (most congested hour) of the day as a month’s 
average (e.g. 10-11 a.m.). 
· Let r be the monthly traffic in h (e.g. 22,000 minutes). 
· d is defined as the maximum number of minutes that an operator is (really) able to manage in 
a month (the network dimension). 
· r/d is the weight of the hour with the highest traffic in the total potential traffic.  
· K is defined as the number of minutes that an average operator is able to manage in a month 
(then, a particular value of d). The regulator decides it. 
· P is the price. The regulator decides it. 
2.4.1. The average management by capacity block (K) 
Every capacity block that the entrant acquires will be related with a potential transmission of 
2 Mbit/s19. The regulator must solve the problem of how many minutes an (average) operator is 
able to manage with one block, to later determine the (unique for all operators) block price. 
The top average traffic that is transmitted with a connection of 2 Mbit/s, composed of 30 
usable channels of 64 Kbit/s, has been determined by the CMT as follows: It is fixed a quality 
service level of 0.5% (equal for all operators) that corresponds with 63% as recommendable 
maximum level of traffic by connection in h20. This is equivalent to 19 channels each one 
transmitting 60 minutes (other combinations are possible). It gives a total of 1,142 minutes. In 
order to take this amount to a monthly level, it is multiplied by 25 (5 days less per month due to 
the weekends) and by 11/12 (considering the effect of the smaller traffic during the summer 
                                                
17 At least at the recommended capacity. 
18 More extensive definitions of these and other related concepts can be found in references 1, 7, and 8. 
19 Although the minimum amount of interconnection that an entrant can acquire is a circuit of 2 Mbit/s, the capacity 
can be contracted for multiples of smaller units, particularly, channels of 64 Kbit/s, being able to contract the rest per 
time. However, and without modifying the essence of the document, we take a circuit of 2 Mbit/s, as the minimum 
amount of capacity that can be contracted. 
20 According to Erlang B table. 
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months) then we have r=26,171. We take this value as a technical restriction and the same for all 
the operators. 
The CMT has determined that r/K =.13. Then, finally, we have a monthly average of 
201,314 minutes by a connection of 2 Mbit/s, i.e., the regulator has defined K=201,314 (th n, K
is a parameter in the model). Nevertheless, r/K=.13 is an average estimation, thus, the 
operators could be able to manage more or less traffic based on other factors21. 
The network sizing is determined by r, function of the quality service level, whereas the 
convenience of one or another model is determined by volume of estimated minutes. 
When deciding the price of the capacity block (P), the regulator deliberately has tried that 
both models were practically price equivalent, that is, 
K
P=a , as we can see if we compare the 
third columns for each model in Table 122. In this fashion, he tries to distort as little as he cans, 
the total average cost of the operators (economic continuity between models). Although, oing 
this, he doesn’t grant the new operators the possibility of u ing the price advantage as a direct 
promoter of the IxC model. The regulator considers that the assignm nt of this objective rests on 
the idea of network dimension, which we comment in the following section. 
Type of traffic p/p/h p/op/h pond/p** K (2Mbit/s)/P e/p/p
minutes
 Local 0.757 0.457 0.661 201,314 132,611 0.659
Metropolitan 1.046 0.625 0.836 201,314 167,521 0.832
Simple 1.16 0.697 1.012 201,314 202,758 1.007
Double 2.218 1.334 1.935 201,314 387,380 1.924
p/p/h :  price per minute in peak hours;        p/op/h :  price per minute in off-peak hours;        pond/p :  pondered price;    
(2Mbit/s)/P :  price per capacity block;       e/p/p :  equivalent price per minute;
source:  Own elaboration with CMT data.
*  Combined capacity (voice + Internet).
   politan traffic where it is taken to equal parts).       
** It is considered that a 68 % of the traffic correspond to normal tariffs and a 32 % to the reduced one (except metro-
Interconnection per time Interconnection by capacity*
  euro-cents / min euro-cents   euro-cents / min
 
Table 1: Price comparison between models. 
2.4.2. The network dimension by capacity block (d) 
The network dimension concept is only crucial for those entrants who choose the IxC
contract. They will have the added responsibility to plan his interconnection resources to be able 
to use efficiently the service offered by the incumbent. Those that prefer the per-time contract are 
indifferent to dimension matters because the incumbent provides to them on the spot the required 
interconnection. In this sense, it would not be necessary to make an anticipated and precise 
forecast for the interconnection requirements. 
                                                
21 Evidently, the ideal for an operator is that his traffic was perfectly distributed (that is, r/d = %17.424/1 » ).
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The argument that gives sustenance to the network dimension concept is that the 
interconnection capacity contracted by an operator doesn’t have to be equal to the traffic indeed 
attended to him, which will be function of his performance that, as well, will be function of his 
owns characteristics. Hence, it is not an exogenous variable. Unlike the IxT, the entrant has the 
possibility of being able to manage the capacity in an efficient way (d>K) and the risk of its 
inefficient management (d<K)23. Anyway, it is necessary to say that, in the model, once chosen 
the way to compete, the only decision variables of an operator are his retail prices; then, given 
these, he knows his network dimension (there are no exogenous factors as demand shocks). 
Therefore, it would have to verify
( )q,,,, 2211 mpmpfd = . 
Where q is the initial value vector. Particularly, in a first approach, we have wanted to 
evaluate the consequences of considering the network dimensi n dependent of the operator’s 
market size (then, operators do the best their market size allows them). An operator influences 
the market by means of his prices. For him, more aggressiveness in prices produces, ceteris 
paribus, a greater market share and this facilitates a greater network dimension that, as well, 
allows taking advantage of much bigger economies of scale. Consequently, this variable is 
internalized.  
According to the CMT, will be the ability to motivate the demand, the correct management of 
the interconnection traffic, and the incursion towards new models of businesses as resale, and the 
sharing of interconnection points, that that will make possible th optimal use of the contracted 
interconnection capacity24. We put emphasis in the two firsts of the previous activities and 
considered appropriate to relate them with the operator’s market size. The reason is, and t is is 
the hypothesis, that proportionally as an operator is gaining market size, will be in better 
disposition to extend his package of services25 (local telephony, long distance, Internet, data, and 
so forth) and/or to model properly his subscribers demand, through the design of his supply 
(publicity, packages, discounts in certain calls, etc.) increasing his traffic in off-peak hours as a 
result (this is independent of h ). That is, we suppose that it is in the operator’s interest be more 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 According to the data, an average difference of .5% exists but it is ignored throughout the rest of the paper. Se  tha
this equivalence is at unitary level but not at aggregate level where is satisfied only when the bought units under IxT 
are a multiple of K. In any other case, the cost under IxC is higher. 
23 Strictly speaking, in this version this risk is omitted (except when the entrant is sufficiently small) since the operators 
“don’t mistake” when planning their capacity necessities. Although the Oferta de Interconexión de Referencia (OIR) 
2001 establishes a group of formal procedures about capacity requests and the fin  by lack of fulfillment of the same 
ones, these will not have implication in the model because complete information exist (although imperfect because the 
decisions will be taken simultaneously). It is necessary to take into account that these penalties would act like added 
incentive to increase the traffic or to make a moderate planning with the purpose of avoiding them. 
24 Notice that in the design of a resale (secondary) market, the excess capacity of an operator will be useful for another 
one, if and only if, is managed by the first one. This is because it is indeed his own management that makes possible 
this excess capacity. 
25 We only see the traffic volume and its distribution. Then, it doesn’t matter that there are only one good in the market. 
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generalist and to have a diversified supply, which is easy to observe in the real market. In 
conclusion, he obtains more flexibility. Nevertheless, we will take only an average price (the 
equilibrium price). Therefore, given that the entrant has acquired, for example, one capacity 
block will be easier for him to reach more than K minutes, obtaining a smaller unit cost. 
Particularly, we have settled that the network dimension for operator i satisfies the following 
equality 
,22 fYnZd +=  (2) 
that depends on the operator’s number of subsc ibers26, and the parameters Z, and Y (>0). Z is the 
management capacity when f2=0, e.g., at the beginning of the competition, his intrinsic 
characteristics allow the operator to manage Z mi ut s. It fulfills r<Z<K. The contribution of 
each consumer in the better network management is Y. 
It is important to remember that when buying a capacity block, the operator doesn’t get a 
fixed amount of minutes, but a transmission possibility, where K is only a reference when 
trying to obtain an equivalence with the IxT model. Nevertheless, the block price is fixed and 
equal to P. Then, the internalization of the network dimension is an added incentive to compete 
more aggressively in prices. This is the bet of the regulator when introducing the IxC model. 
We have 
22
171,26
fYnZd
r
+
= , then, the operator has an incentive to diminish his r/d (given that the 
block price is fixed x ante) but, as defined in page 8, the regulator has fixed the numerator, so, 
the problem is to try to increase d (r/d<(>).13 ® d>(<)K). The only way to satisfy it, is 
competing more aggressiv ly (ignoring the strategic effect that this could have in the rival). For 
whom that cannot modify his traffic pattern over the level fixed by the regulator (K), the adoption 
of the IxC model will not be profitable. 
As d represents a maximum value (maximum management capacity), if the newcomer 
considers it appropriate (if this maximize his benefits) he would choose not to operate his 
dimension at that level. Nevertheless, given a set of prices, the entrant’s best strategy is to 
maximize the use of his capacity. Then, when speaking of network dimension, we will refer to 
the maximum possible level, d27. 
2.5. The operators under IxT 
The operators maximize their benefits in a non-cooperative way in every period. Simplifying, 
from now on, assign wj to the amount of total call minutes (minutes of traffic), demanded to 
                                                
26 Of this form, the equilibrium prices are independent of n. 
27 Anyway, this is checked in the simulations. Look at section 2.4.2 and Appendix 3 for a more detailed analysis of the 
concept of network dimension. 
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operator j (wj=nfjxj), and mj to the total of his affili ted (mj=nfj). If the entrant decided to 
compete under IxT, the incumbent’s benefits function that the literature habitually suggests is 
( ) ( ) ( )1112111 fmccp ba -+-+-= mawwp . 
The operator obtains income derived from the sale of call minutes to his affiliated (in its 
case), as well as of the subscription fee received from them (in its cas ). Moreover, he obtains 
income from the sale of interconnection to the entrant. A particular version for the (extreme) case 
of interest in which the incumbent’s marginal costs or costs related to the traffic, ca, cb (cost on 
net and off net, respectively, of a call minute, a interconnection minute or a transmission unit) 
were sufficiently near to zero28 (zero at the margin), is 
( ) 11112111 Ffmp --++= mawwp . (3) 
In counterpart, it has been added a fixed cost (F1) related to previous investments that will be 
considered prorated x ante and constant throughout time29. According to the prior specification, 
this term will not affect the equilibrium prices, so we can ignore it. As a result, an approach to the 
cost structure that was commented in earlier sections has been obtained.  
On the other hand, the entrant’s benefits function is  
( ) ( )222222 fmp -+-= mawp , (4) 
which similarly, includes the possibility of obtaining a rent by the same first two concepts already 
commented for the incumbent but has the disadvantage of the variable cost related to the 
purchase of interconnection30. 
2.6. The operators under IxC31 
If the entrant decided to compete under IxC, th  incumbent’s benefits function is 
( ) ( ) 111122111 FfmidiPp --+-++= mawwp , (5) 
where, from now on, i will be the number of capacity blocks acquired by the entrant. The 
fundamental change with respect to the IxT model (equation 3) is that now, part of the income 
                                                
28 That a>cb=0 occurs, could be imposed by the regulator to allow the recovery of some previous investment related to 
the network operation (e.g. access deficit related to the universal service provision). 
29 Take into account that many of the future conclusions could be determined by this cost assumption. 
30 Since the entrant doesn’t have his own network, in a rigorous sense he will require two interconnection units by call 
minute that he serves (one related with the calling part and other with the receiving part). For the same reason, the 
interconnection networks requirements will be multiplied by two (although it could be considered that an important 
amount of calls would be terminated in others interconnection points, the one at i sue would receive an equivalent 
amount of minutes of the others ones, assuming isotropic calling pattern). Anyway and without losing the essence of 
which it is tried to develop, a per-minute interconnection cost will be a and the value of d will serve to manage d call 
minutes. 
31 It is opportune to saythat has not been designed an structure that faithfully reflects the technical aspects of a IxC 
model, but rather, one that develops an alternative form to describe the entrant’s purchase of interconnection. Lo k a  
Appendix 1 for a more detailed analysis of the definition of the entrant benefits in the IxC model.
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derived from the sale of call minutes of interconnection, w2a, which is direct function of the 
(present) prices, is replaced by the income derived from the capacity blocks that the entrant 
acquire, iP, which is indirect function of the (present) prices, remaining the preceding structure 
solely for the adjustment units (assume those are few in proportion). The explanation is the 
following: the component in IxT, w2a, is relevant in the determination of both operators’ prices 
and under IxC it is not. Finally, under the IxT regime, the competition relaxes because both 
operators include a in their prices. The entrant does it fully and forced and the incumbent 
partially and at expenses of the entrant. The component in the case of IxC, iP, doesn’t have 
influence in the prices (but the prices has influence in iP), thus, t is eliminated a strategic 
component in the incumbent’s behavior (the IxC partly tries to obtain less dependency of the 
newcomer to the incumbent) and simultaneously a menu of options is offer to the entrant. In any 
case, the final decision taken by the entrant will depend of the pr sent and previous prices. For 
this operator, the benefit function32 is, for i=1,2,3... 
( )
( )( ) ( )ïî
ï
í
ì
>-+---+
£-+-
=
.
,
2222222222
2222222
2
idiffmiPpidpid
idiffmiPp
wmaw
wmw
p  (6) 
He maximizes this function choosing {i, p2, m2}. As it is observed, the amount demanded and 
the amount contracted are two different variables. If the amount demanded to the entrant is 
smaller to his capacity of total management, he will have excess capacity. On the contrary, if the 
amount demanded is bigger that this capacity, he will require extra units of interconnection to 
satisfy it. The benefit functions are summarized in the following table 
If 
1p  2p  
IxT ( ) 1111211 Ffmp --++ maww  ( ) ( )22222 fmp -+- maw  
IxC and w2² id2 ( ) ( ) 11112211 FfmidiPp --+-++ maww  ( )22222 fmiPp -+- mw  
IxC and w2> id2 ( ) ( ) 11112211 FfmidiPp --+-++ maww  ( )( ) ( )22222222 fmiPpidpid -+---+ maw  
Table 2: The operator’s problem. 
The entrant chooses between IxT a d IxC. That w2£ id2 or w2> id2 occurs is a consequence of 
the competition process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Notice that this function can be simplified to ( ) ( ){ }22222222 ,0max idfmiPp ---+-= wamwp . Nonetheless, 
we don’t use this short version because is less illustrative. 
A dynamic model of competition under a capacity interconnection regime 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________________
13
3. Tariff schemes and equilibriums 
Three different tariff schemes are contemplated33: linear tariffs, plain (flat) tariffs, and two-
part tariffs (per-unit price and subscription fee). Evidently, in the case of linear tariffs, m1=m2=0 
and in the case of flat tariffs, p1=p2=0
34. Before continuing, we show the particular expressions 
that we have used to obtain the equilibrium values. Let us consider, ( )
g2
2Bx
Axxu -=  úû
ù
êë
éÎ"
B
A
x
g
,0  
where A, B >0; a quadratic function that satisfy section 2.2. A demand of the type ( )B
pAx -= g  is 
derived. Therefore, the indirect utility function is ( ) ( )
B
pA
mpv
2
2-
+-=
g
h . g is an exogenous demand 
shock, inactive until now. 
The parameters have been arbitrarily fixed so that an operator with f_>.08 (and sufficient 
amount demanded) is able to obtain added benefits when contracting by capacity, i.e., 
Kd =
= 08.2 2f
. Particularly we take Z= 186,402=7.12r and Y= 37.28 (see Appendix 3). Next, we 
review the equilibrium results for the diff rent tariff schemes35. 
3.1. Linear tariffs (per-minute price) only 
IxT. The equilibrium prices are36
( )
2
11
211*
1 Bx
xBx
p
+
+
=
sf
asf , (7a) 
2
22
22*
2 Bx
Bx
p
+
+=
sf
sf
a , (7b) 
IxC. The equilibrium prices are 
--  
2
11
11*
1 Bx
Bx
p
+
=
sf
sf , (8a) 
                                                
33 Nevertheless, strictly speaking, despite the scheme structure, there is only a single type of tariff evaluated in the 
extreme cases. It is necessary to indicate that these tariff schemes are not exactly quivalent to a payment by amount of 
transmitted data (in contrast to the habitual prices per time). Moreover we did not take into account other price 
elements (e.g. an initial charge per call) other way to see it is to consider it uniformly distributed in this one. Then, is 
irrelevant the relation of units of measurement with the call duration. If these elements were separately considered, the 
model would increase in complexity (in principle, it would be necessary to introduce a probability distribution for the 
duration of the calls). 
34 A flat tariffs is a unique payment per period, independent (at least in a direct way) of the amount demanded by 
consumer. Nonetheless, it is necessary to take into account, that the fact that p2=0, doesn’  imply that p2 is independent 
of d2. 
35 Although losing generality, in order to gain clarity, not only we will assume f1=f2=0 and g=1 in the simulations, but 
in addition, from now on, we will omit them in the equations. 
36 It is necessary to notice that, in the next expressions, the equilibrium prices are not result of an exhaustive clearance. 
Thus, those are only streamlined expressions derived of the FOC. Moreover, the expressions to the right of the 
following equalities are evaluated in the equilibrium prices, nevertheless,trying to gain clarity in the document, we 
omit the abusive use of “*”. 
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2
22
22
Bx
Bx
+sf
sf ,_              - if-_-w2<id2, 
ï
ï
ï
î
ïï
ï
í
ì
=*2p     ( )
2
22
22
Bx
YiBx
+
-
+
sf
asf
a ,-_     if---w2>id2. 
(8b) 
It is observed that for the same market share under both models, the prices in IxC are alway
smaller to the prices in IxT. 
IxT. The equilibrium benefits are 
2
22
2
2
2
2*
2 Bx
xBn
+
=
sf
fs
p ,-------------- (9) 
IxC. The equilibrium benefits are37 
Ki
Bx
xBn
a
sf
fs
-
+ 222
2
2
2
2 ,-                     _if ----w2<id2,    
ï
ï
ï
î
ïï
ï
í
ì
=*2p  
( )KYi
Bx
iYxBn
-+
+
+
a
sf
asffs
2
22
2
2
2
2
2
2 ,- if ----w2>id2. 
(10) 
 
3.2. Plain tariffs (subscription fee) only
IxT. The equilibrium prices are 
( )021*1 xm asf += , (11a) 
( )022*2 xm asf += , (11b) 
IxC. The equilibrium prices are 
It is observed that for the same market share under both models, the prices in IxC are alway
smaller to the prices in IxT. 
IxT. The equilibrium benefits are 
                                                
37 The entrant price just in the crossing of the curves is omitted for all the tariffs. 
 ( ) Yixm aasf -+= 021*1 , (12a) 
2sf ,-__---_:___       - if ----w2<id2,     
î
í
ì
=*2m  
( ) Yix aasf -+ 022 ,--  if ----w2>id2. 
(12b) 
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2
2
*
2 sfp n= ,    (13) 
 
IxC. The equilibrium benefits are 
Kin asf -22 ,----_  _- if -- -w2<id2,   
ï
î
ï
í
ì
=*2p  ( )KYin -+ asf 22 ,--- if - --w2>id2. (14) 
 
3.3. Two-part tariffs 
IxT. The equilibrium prices are 
0*1 =p , (15a) 
a=*2p , (15b) 
( )aasf 21*1 xm += , (15c) 
2
*
2 sf=m , (15d) 
IxC. The equilibrium prices are 
 0*1 =p , (16a) 
0,-- ----__ _- if ----w2<id2, 
î
í
ì
=*2p  
a ,-----_  _--- if---- w2>id2. 
(16b) 
 ( ) Yixm aaasf -+= 21*1 , (16c) 
2sf , --_ - -   _-if --_-w2<id2, 
î
í
ì
=*2m  
Yiasf -2 , --- -if-- -- w2>id2. 
(16d) 
It is observed that for the same mark t share under both models, the prices in IxC are always 
smaller to the prices in IxT. 
IxT. The equilibrium benefits are 
2
2
*
2 sfp n= , (17) 
 
IxC. The equilibrium benefits are 
Kin asf -22 ,_-    _- if -_--w2<id2,    (18a) 
î
í
ì
=*2p  
( )KYin -+ asf 22 ,-  if ----w2>id2.    (18b) 
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It can be seen that under IxC, the equilibrium prices are smaller whatever the type of tariff 
(which is fulfilled for an ample rank of values of the parameters); nevertheless, this doesn’t give 
much light about if these will be finally the market prices.  
Next, some results related to the different types of tariffs are comment. In the case of linear 
tariffs, the equilibrium benefits under IxC g nerate a plus (
2
22
2
2
Bx
iY
+sf
asf , when comparing with IxT) 
reason why it could be easier that it becomes the best entrant’s option.  
This doesn’t happen in two-part tariffs. The operator prefers to be aggressive and choose a 
price that generates at least a demand equal to his capacity because he knows he can buy in per-
time basis the differential. Nevertheless, he will not be “too” aggressive as to incur in a situation 
in which it would fail to take advantage of a certain percentage of his contracted capacity. With 
two-part tariffs, the entrant will require more incentives to choose IxC because in equilibrium 
everything depends on the market share gain. If this is not sufficient in IxC (as f nally it happens 
under two-part tariffs), he doesn’t choose this model even though he would be able at any
moment to manage more minutes than those initially proposed by the regulator (or that the 
regulator decrease the price of the capacity unit). This because in any case the fixed cost 
compensates the possible income increase (the previous commentaries are valid fo  changes 
inferiors to 10%). Then, starting in the typical IxT model the entrant benefices by the possibility 
of using non-linear tariffs (although in damage not only of the incumbent but also of the 
consumers). Nevertheless, under two-part tariffs, the IxC hardly could represent an option, 
because the market share variations when changing from IxT to IxC are less significant under this 
type of tariff. 
With two-parts tariffs, the entrant fixes a retail price equal to his marginal cost (real and 
perceived). Conversely, the incumbent, due to his cost structure, chooses a price equal to zero 
(plain tariffs). It is evident that the latter would prefer to move to a situation of flat tariffs. This 
would avoid that the entrant recovered the variable cost (etail price); at the same time, the 
incumbent would be able to increase his subscription fee. If the market share was the same in 
both tariffs structures, the entrant is indifferent between the application of flat tariffs and the 
application of a two-part tariffs (he obtains equal benefits). Nonetheless, as it were seen, 
incumbent would be wishing a policy of flat tariffs. It is clear also that, if the market share was 
the same in both tariffs, both operators prefer non-linea  tariffs. 
4. Welfare implications 
Evidently, the use of different tariff schemes has implications in the welfare. The welfare 
measures used in this document are defined in the following way 
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21 pp +=PS , (19b) 
PSCSW += . (19c) 
The efficiency measurement used to compare the models is the aggregate welfare throughout 
the periods (t=35)38. Next, we show a graph that illustrates the essence under IxT. 
 
Figure 1: Competition evolution under linear tariffs. 
Using the parameters shown in Appendix 5, starting in IxT and comparing whit the IxT-IxC 
option we obtain (for linear tariffs) and aggregate decrease of .73% in PS but an increase of .53% 
CS. Finally an increase of .24% in W is obtained. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have reviewed a proposal to design the recently introduced interconnection 
by capacity for the case of fixed networks of telecommunications; the main results are the 
following: 
 
                                                
38 We consider T=35. With this value, the changes in the equilibrium values from one period to the xt are practically 
null. 
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The first conclusion emerges in a very natural way: if the newcomers are not able to 
influence the dimension of their network and if this dimension were fixed and equal to K, that is, 
d=K, the IxT model dominates the model of IxC (see Appendix 4 for a formal demonstration). 
Therefore, the IxC (taking into account the proportionality in the prices that the CMT has 
decided) doesn’t offer any added advantage to the entrant but can bring to them the added risk to 
have to plan the necessities of interconnection in a precise way. The previous remark is valid 
independently of the entrant’s size (market share). 
The second conclusion is that: the entrants will have to reach a critical mass before they will 
be interested in the IxC model. If their market share is sufficiently small, choosing a contract of 
IxC could generate a very aggressive reaction in the incumbent that would not allow the entrant 
to obtain (and even lose) market share. This, independently of the commitments the entrant could 
incur due to the payment of the fixed cost. Therefore, it is not so evident that the IxC is the way 
in which the small entrants (in the initial phase of entrance) can begin to grow in the market. 
Designing the network dimension as it has been done (direct function of the market share) 
and taking into account the values of the used parameters, the entrant prefers to be aggressive and 
choose the IxT model but only when linear tariffs apply. With two-part tariffs, the entrant will 
require more incentives to choose IxC because in equilibrium everything depends on the market 
share gain. If this is not sufficient in IxC (as finally it happens under two-part tariffs) he doesn’t 
choose this model even though he would be able at any moment to manage more minutes than 
those initially proposed by the regulator (or that the regulator decrease the price of the capacity 
unit), because in not case the fixed cost compensates the possible income increase (the previous 
commentaries are valid for changes inferiors to 10%). Then, under two-part tariffs, the IxC hardly 
could represent an option, because the market share variations when changing from IxT to IxC are 
less significant under this type of tariff. 
Hence, welfare gains are obtained under IxC, although these ones are dissipated through time. 
It is necessary to remember that much of the results depend on the particular form in which 
the competition model has been designed. 
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Appendix 1
In agreement with the form in which the entrant’s benefits have been defined under IxC is 
reciprocal that the incumbent’s benefits correspond with the following function39. 
( )
( ) ( )ïî
ï
í
ì
>--+-++
£--++
=
.
,
2212211111
22111111
1
idifFidfmiPp
idifFfmiPp
wawmw
wmw
p   
Where he only chooses a set of prices and accept de i chosen by the entrant. Nevertheless, it 
generates a significant problem when finding equilibriums. Let us start analyzing the which’s and 
the why’s about the active benefits curves for each operator.  
Given a q and an incumbent’s price, the entrant’s benefits function for the relevant values of 
his price draws a continuous (not differentiable in a point) curve in form of “v” inverted, that is, 
the active functions are the interiors ones (see Appendix 2) so, the maximum tends to the 
threshold. Deepening a little more, we could say than the entrant doesn’t have excessive interest 
in raising his price because that would means not to optimize the investment incurred x ante. 
But at the same time he doesn’t have too much interest in diminishing his price either, because 
although small reductions could help him to improve the distribution of his traffic, an important 
reduction would imply to exceed the invested capacity and to have to buy on a per-time basis the 
non-covered interconnection, which, in cost terms, doesn’t represent any added benefit to him.  
Instead, given a q and an entrant price, the incumbent’s benefits function for the relevant 
values of his price, draws a continuous (not differentiable in a point) curve in form of “m”, that 
is, the active functions are the exteriors ones. The incumbent faces a trade off. On the one hand, 
is good for him to increase his price and, of this form, to transfer more income to IxT, but on the 
other, he has an incentive to lower it, and thus, increase his own amount demanded, making 
impossible for the entrant to recover the investment he has incurred as an added result. In other 
words, the incumbent could have incentives to make fail the entrant in his capacity estimations by 
defect as much as by excess. 
In most of the cases this function will have a clear global maximum, nevertheless, for certain 
price combinations, infinitesimal changes in the entrant’s price can cause that the global 
maximum jump of one “hump” to the other, i.e., a discontinuity occurs in the incumbent’s 
reaction function. 
Considering the difficulty of economically justify a function of this type40, aside from the 
mentioned complications finding equilibrium values (since generally the optimization code finds 
                                                
39 Notice that this function can be simplified to ( ) ( ){ }221111111 ,0max idFfmiPp -+--++= wamwp . 
40 Although a intuitively justification exist to this jump in the reaction function. When the entrant reach a size such that 
in a certain period the decision to choose or not an extra unit of capacity is relevant, if the entrant is very aggressive, 
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local maximums) we have decided to work with only one part (of two) of the function to describe 
the incumbent’s behavior. Next, we comment the pros and cons of each possibility as well as the 
final decision. 
Doing ( )111111 fmiPp -++= mwp  implies that the incumbent doesn’t receive extra income by 
the units that the entrant decides to buy on a per-time basis. Then, it would be necessary to justify 
that the entrant is able to contract interconnection coming from another supplier different of the 
incumbent (which contradict the model specifications in which the incumbent is the only source 
of interconnection in the market) s well as justify why the incumbent cannot sell interconnection 
in these conditions. Finally, when mod ling of this form, the incumbent’s equilibrium price turns 
out to be so much aggressive because it doesn’t include the variable component. In these 
conditions, occurs a hard competition to conquer the marketand produces that the IxC model 
could be a non-attractive option to the entrant unless the regulator fixed K sufficiently below to 
his real possibilities, this means K
P>>a 41. 
Doing ( ) ( )awmwp 22111111 idfmiPp -+-++=  implies that the income referred to the units 
bought under the IxT model is taken into account, but this same factor will represent a negative 
component of the incumbent’s benefits when w2<id2. Since to be too aggressive would generate 
just this situation it seems reasonable to see this negative element as a kind of fine that the 
regulatory authority imposes to him to avoid disloyal competition. It would work as follows: if 
the entrant has invested sufficiently to obtain a capacity management level and he really has 
obtained it (under the assumption that the entrant doesn’t speculat ) the fact that he finally 
doesn’t obtain the corresponding amount demanded would be adjudged to the opportunistic 
behavior of the incumbent. Anyway, the newcomer doesn’t have interest to cause a situation of 
this type either, because important investments that must be amortized are in game. Instead of the 
one in the previous paragraph, this alternative generates sensibly superior incumbent’s prices. 
Evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each of the previous options it has been 
chosen to work with the last one. In any case, the decision is not trivial. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the incumbent chooses high price to cause a greater demand under the IxT regime. In the opposite case, the incumbent 
is not requested by added interconnection then, he puts all his efforts in maintaining the market share and in addition he 
causes an entrant excess capacity. 
41 Look that is not enough that d > Kbecause if K
P=a remains also the IxT is affected by the cut of prices. 
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Appendix 2
The following is valid whatever the type of tariff. 
In this appendix, we show (in separat  graphs mode, for a particular q and a p1) the strategic 
behavior intrinsic to the definition of the entrant’s benefit curves under IxC, for several different 
situations. The following cases are compared: a) when he only could manage K minutes (d2=K), 
and, b) when he is able to determine his network dimension according to d2=Z+Ynf2. 
We suppose that p2¢ satisfy w2=id2 when d2=K, similarly, p2² satisfy w2=id2 when d2=Z+Ynf2. 
Prices superior to p2¢ and p2², in each case, imply that the active benefits function will be that 
defined for w2£ id2. Also, prices inferior to p2¢ and p2², imply that the active benefits function will 
be that defined for w2>id2. The price that finally maximizes the entrant’s benefits (and therefore 
the one he chooses) will be p2
* (review the graphics).  
 
 
Figure 2: Passive condition (I). Direct and indirect effects. 
As it is show in Figure 2, if the operator is sufficiently small (this is the cause according to the 
model but actually the reasons could be very diverse) could occur that the possibility of 
internalize the network dimens on doesn’t have any effect in the entrant’s decision. The operator 
maximizes his benefits at p2
*, hat is, his capacity of management is superior to the amount 
demanded to him42, i.e., w2£ id2. An aggressive behavior (in prices) doesn’t represent any added 
benefit to him. The entrant will have excess capacity. 
                                                
42 This happens because the entrant has not reached a critical mass. Then the cause is that w2 is small and not that d2 is
great. 
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In Figure 3, the operator chooses p2
* o that, at the end, his capacity of management is 
superior to the amount demanded to him (w2< id2). However, if the operator had had a fixed (and 
equal to K) dimension would have selected p2¢ (where p2¢ >p2* and p2¢ < p2*). It is necessary to 
indicate that the entrant doesn’t take full advantage of the opportunity that the dimension 
provides to him. Anyway, the possibility of determining the network’s size urges him (partially) 
to a more aggressive price competition. He will have excess capacity. 
 
Figure 3: Active condition (partially). Direct effect. 
As Figure 4 shown, the operator increases his income using the maximum of his network’s 
size possibilities43 (he has incentives to increase the variety of his services supply). Besides, the 
consumers enjoy the decrease in p2
 that change from p2¢ to p2². It is interesting to observe that the 
threshold agrees with p2
*. The entrant equals his capacity to his demand. 
Figure 5 represent the situation in which to use the dimension network at the maximum level 
is the entrant’s best choice. Nevertheless, it is not clear if this means an increase or a decrease in 
p2 with respect to the situation where d2=K, that will depend on the relation between the 
maximums (in this case implies a decrease). As it is observed, the thresholds are irrelevant in the 
determination of p2
*. Anyway, in Figure 5 the equilibrium price implies that the operator will 
require added interconnection. 
                                                
43 Is obvious that the new situation must be better than that, that he leaves (p2¢< p2²). Otherwise, he did not do the 
change (since complete information exists). Then, the network dimension give to the entrant a maximum level but, if 
he believe that is not recommendable exploit it, could fix smaller values (being more passive as far as its supply of 
services for example). According to the values of the parameters, this is not the case. 
A dynamic model of competition under a capacity interconnection regime 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________________
23
 
Figure 4: Active condition (totally). Direct effect. 
 
 
Figure 5: Passive condition (II). Direct effect. 
The previous figures only include the direct effects generated by the possibility of network 
dimension44. To completely understand the competition process is necessary to take into account 
the strategic effects triggered by the rival (indirect effects) as illustrated in Figure 6 (that is the 
same situation that it is show in Figure 4 but including all the effects) and Figure 7.  
                                                
44 Although changing of a situation “a” to a situation “b” (see page 21) implies a transformation in the entrant benefit 
functions and therefore in his best respond function, can o cur the case that the changes in the reaction occur in values 
sufficiently remote to the equilibrium (then, remaining constant). This is the case shown in Figure 2. 
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It is useful to suppose that we started in an equilibrium situation under d2=K. But ow the 
entrant is able to determine his network dimension in such a way that his benefit functions ends 
up moving, evidently, also does his reaction function, changing from R2¢(p1) to R2º(p1) (note that 
the reaction functions, Figure 7, correspond to those of strategic substitutes operators). In this 
new situation the entrant fix p2º, where p2²< p2º<p2¢, with which he increase his benefits. At this 
price, the incumbent’s best response is 1º that fulfills p1º<p1¢. 
The increase in the aggressiveness will cause a general decrease in the entrant’s benefits 
function when w2>id2 (for an ample parameter rank). This is because he doesn’t obtain the 
awaited market share but also because he has incurred ex a te in a fixed investment, reason why 
he is himself forced to make another marginal reduction in p2 (“to recover part of the pie”) to 
which the incumbent responds with a marginal decrease in p1. In a final stage (the process 
finishes when the curves are totally adjusted, i.e., when no one operator wish to change his 
decisions given the decision of the rival) the entrant fix his price at p2*=p2² and the incumbent 
responds with p1*=p1².45 
 
Figure 6: Active condition (totally). Direct and indirect effects. 
 
                                                
45 In order to illustrate the competition process it has been tried to separate the effects in time and in its influence. 
Obviously, that happens simultaneously and affects the aggregate of functions. 
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Figure 7: The competition process. 
Up to here, have been reviewed the problem related with how is chosen the competition price 
since the operator has acquired a certain level of capacity. A different problem is the way in 
which the entrant chooses a particular model.  
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Appendix 3
In Table 3, is showing an example46 of the way in which the code works when choosing the 
entrant’s best strategy. A “Yes” implies that the number of acquired blocks of capacity sat sfies 
the amount demanded and a “No”, the opposite one.  
IxC # Situation IxT 
1 block 2 blocks 3 blocks 4 blocks 
1 d2<×2 - No - - - 
2 ×2²d2 - Yes - - - 
3 2d2<×2 - - No - - 
4 ×2²2d2 - - Yes - - 
5 3d2<×2 - - - No - 
6 ×2²3d2 - - - Yes - 
7 4d2<×2 - - - - No 
8 ×2²4d2 - - - - Yes 
Table 3: An example of the code operation. 
In the “situations” preparation has been taken into account that if ( ) 222 fj YnZd += , and if the 
entrant’s market share fluctuates according to 6.0 2 ££ j , then the network dimension fluctuates 
according to nYZdZ 6.2 +££ . 
 Technical 
(maximum) 
Observed by the 
regulator (CMT) Used in the paper 
d [r,   24r] * [5r,   10r] [7.12r,   10.68r] 
r/d [1,   .042] [.2,   .1] [.1404,   .0936] 
Table 4: Dimension network limits 
 
*We supposed the entrants always have at least t chnic lly saturated one most congested hour. 
 
The viable technical rank is very ample and is not observed in reality. In fact the CMT has 
indicated that the operators who handle business voice or residential Internet have approximately 
r/d=.18 whereas more generalist operators can even reach an r/d=.10. The incumbent can even be 
below this last value. The parameters Z and Y have been determined taking into account f2Î[0, 
.6] and r/d=[.2,   .1] as the relevant ranges. Nevertheless as a result we obtain K is very near to 
the superior limit of the rank, so it would be necessary that the entrant gained a significant market 
share to reach it, so we arbitrarily has settle r/d= [.1404,   .0936]. 
                                                
46 It only shows the relevant information according to the used values of the parameters. 
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Appendix 4
Next, we show how, under certain circumstances, “to choose IxT” dominates “to choose IxC”.
Some of these conditions have been satisfied voluntarily by the regulation. Then, it is evident that 
the authority trusts in other kind of “solutions” in order to promote the IxC. Particularly we will 
prove the following proposition: 
Independently of the tariff scheme used, taking the incumbent’s prices as given, in the 
presence of both interconnection models, with interconnections prices proportionally 
equivalents, and without the possibility of modifying the productivity of the contracted 
capacity (d2=K), the decision “to choose IxT” dominates the decision “ to choose IxC”. 
Given the incumbent’s prices we can rewrite equations 4 and 6 a  
( ) ( ) ( )22222222 , fmpmpT -+-= mawp , 
( ) ( )( ) ( )22222222222 /, fmiPpidiKpiKmpC -+---+=> mawwp , 
where exceptionally superscripts T and C have been used to distinguish between IxT and IxC 
respectively. Expanding the second of those expressions, grouping and remembering that K
P=a , 
is easy to arrive at 
( ) ( ) ( )222222222 /, fmpiKmpC -+-=> mawwp , 
thus, 
( ) ( )iKmpmp CT >º 2222222 /,, wpp . 
That means that the entrant’s benefits when choosing IxT are the same ones he obtains when 
choosing IxC given w2>id2. Then, if the option “to choose IxC” were attractive to him, that would 
have to happen when w2²id2, receiving (according to equation 6)  
( ) ( )222222222 /, fmiPpiKmpC -+-=£ mwwp , 
but using K
P=a  the previous expression can be rewrite it as 
( ) ( )222222222 /, fmKipiKmpC -+-=£ mawwp , 
that is to say, he has expenses of iaK, nevertheless, when contracting IxT the expenses are aw2 
(assume in both cases that f2=0). Taking into account that this part of the analysis is valid when 
w2²iK, there is no doubt that the expenses when contracting capacity are greater than those when 
contracting time, and only in the margin (when w2=iK) is equivalent. In other words, adding 
earlier results 
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( )iKmpCT >º 22222 /, wpp  
( )iKmpCT £³ 22222 /, wpp  
This result is independent of the way in which is defined the incumbent’s benefits function. 
(See Appendix 1). 
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Appendix 5
Simulations have been running i  Matlab 6. The code has mainly used optimization and 
numerical methods algorithms. Table 5 contains a list of the values of the used parameters. 
 
USED VALUES OF THE PARAMETERS  
Cost parameters Utility parameters 
Network dimension 
parameters 
f1=0 000,51 =
th  r=26,171 
f2=0 
t
2h * K=201,314 
F1=2’206,460 Demand parameters** Z= 186,402=7.12r 
Interconnection price 
parameters 
A=20 Y= 37.28 
= 1.096 B=.039 d=[186,401.85,   279,602.78] 
P=220,646 =1 r/d=[.1404,   .0936] 
Number of periods Competitiveness level Market parameters 
T=35 s =12,000 101 =j  
  002 =j  
  n=5,000 
Table 5: Parameters. 
 
* ( )
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -+=
k
ktttt ,1min
22
11
2
hh
h  where k is the number of periods needed by the entrant to build a 
“track record” of quality. We arbitrarily fix k=16. 
 
**The elasticity of demand  ( pA
p
--=e ) is less than one for the equilibrium per-minut-price, whatever 
the tariff scheme used. 
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